not sure if I’ll expand on this later, but some telegrammish notes.
Assume political groups are meritocratic according to group conduct norms. Ideas rises/spread tied at least in part tied to the conduct of their advocates. Errors of conduct, two types — failure according to group norms, or behavior not conducive to group fluorishing (according to group perspective or according to a different perspective). Metaconduct, two types – deliberate attempt to change norms, deliberate attempt to change someone’s conduct (the latter perhaps a type of governance and/or discipline). Conduct is like conversation, analytical grasp is less important in practice (with regard to success in the group meritocracy) than successful performance within the framework. Types of normative ambiguity: ontological, epistemological, multiple normative orders (normative fragmentation), contending norms (often tied to metanormative disagreement about which should trump). (Generally here I’m not distinguishing between norms and metanorms.)
All of the above is part of the social basis (necessary but not sufficient conditions) for leadership of ideas within an organization. The ideas a group takes on are only partly about the content of those ideas. Attempts to change those ideas often run into resistance beyond the content of the ideas and require work in addition to abstract work upon ideas.
Errors of conduct are harder to deal with than errors of contents; people respond personally because the criticism often really has a personal component within what it entails.
Note to self, see if this connects at all with this and this and this.